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The Journal of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers' Foundation 
Through the Looking 
Glass Darkly: 
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft and 
Second Collision Liability 
David J. Stout, JD. 
David Stout is a lawyer with the Carpenter Law Offices whose 
practice includes products liability. He is a 1982 honors 
graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law. 
"By the pricking of my thumbs, 
Something wicked this way comes:1 
There is a tendency these days during the Republican 
fin de siecle for the plaintiffs' 
bar to experience a distinct itch­
ing of the thumbs when slog­
ging through product liability 
cases from the federal circuit 
courts. The Tenth Circuit in 
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft 
Corporation2, held that New 
Mexico law requires a fact find­
er to compare the negligence of 
a manufacturer for its failure to 
design or manufacture a crash­
worthy vehicle with the origi­
nal tortfeasor's negligence in 
causing the accident to occur. David J. StoutThis holding is in direct con-
flict with the analysis for the tort of crash worthiness articulated 
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Duran v. General 
Motors Corporation3 and operates to undermine the funda­
mental social policies which formed the basis for the tort of 
crashworthiness. A thorough understanding of the Tenth 
Circuit's opinion, which is not binding on New Mexico state 
courts, and the reasons why the court misconstrued New Mexico 
(Continued on Page 158) 
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law is essential for the successful prosecution of a crash­
worthiness case. 
BACKGROUND ON CRASHWORTHINESS 
The doctrine of "crash worthiness" or "second collision "4 
received its judicial baptism in the landmark case of Larsen 
v. General Motors Corporation.5 The Larsen court conclud­
ed that a manufacturer owes a duty to design and manufacture
a "crashworthy" vehicle because automobile accidents are a
fact of life, and therefore entirely foreseeable.6 Larsen stands
for the essential proposition that a person who sustains injuries
or whose injuries are enhanced by the breach of the manufac­
turer's duty to produce a crashworthy vehicle is entitled to
recover for those injuries over and above what would have been
sustained in the initial collision.
An automobile manufacturer owes a duty to 
design and manufacture a "crashworthy" 
vehicle because automobile accidents are a 
fact of life and therefore entirely forseeable. 
New Mexico has followed the great majority of juris­
dictions and adopted the doctrine of crashworthiness. In Duran 
v. General Motors Corporation,7 the Court of Appeals held
that design defects8 which enhance injuries are actionable, even
if the defect did not cause the initial collision. "The fact that
the defect does not cause the initial collision or impact should
make no difference if it causes or enhances the ultimate in­
jury. "9 
There are two noteworthy points about the Duran opin­
ion which are important for a full understanding of the Cleve­
land case. First, the Court of Appeals in Duran adopted a 
negligence standard for an injury-causing or injury-enhancing 
design defect. 10 The holding that a crashworthiness claim
sounds in negligence rather than strict liability allowed the 
Cleveland court to conclude that New Mexico's regime of pure 
comparative negligence requires a comparison of the relative 
fault of the initial tortfeasors and the manufacturing tortfeasor. 
Second, the Duran court required that a plaintiff prove by 
specific evidence or testimony the extent of enhanced injury 
caused by the design defect.11 The Court of Appeals adopted 
the three requirements for proof of proximate cause set out in 
Huddell v. Levin.12 The plaintiff must prove that: (1) the 
defective design caused injuries over and above those which 
otherwise would have been sustained; (2) the specific degree 
or extent of the enhanced injury;13 (3) what injuries, if any, 
would have resulted had the alternative, safer design been 
used. 14 In addition, plaintiff must offer some method of estab­
lishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the design 
defect.15 
The Duran court's requirement of specific proof that the 
design or production defect caused the injuries attributable to 
the second collision is significant for the purposes of under-
standing the flawed analysis in Cleveland. Because the Duran 
court so carefully crafted the requirements relating to pro of of 
the second collision injury, a plaintiff must exclude the initial 
collision as a cause of the injuries. Proof of the second 
collision claim under New Mexico law necessarily excludes 
fault of the original tortfeasors in causing the second collision 
injuries since by definition, the second collision claim can only 
be established with specific evidence that the design or pro• 
duction defect caused the plaintiff's injuries or enhanced the 
injuries caused by the initial collision. Given this regime, the 
Cleveland court's conclusion that New Mexico law requires 
the comparison of fault between the initial and second collision 
tortfeasors constitutes a gross misreading of the Duran opin• 
ion. 
CLEVELAND V. PIPER AIRCRAFT 
The facts of Cleveland involved the crash of a Piper 
Super Cub at the Los Lunas airport. The Piper was pulling 
a glider, piloted by Robert Mudd, which was to be photo• 
graphed for a commercial. The front seat of the Piper had been 
removed and a camera mounted to the 15ase of the removed front 
seat to photograph the glider for the commercial. The pilot 
of the Piper would control the plane from the rear se at. The 
rear seats had seat-belts, but no shoulder harness. 
Cleveland was the pilot of the Piper and employed as 
a glider tow pilot for High Valley Soaring. He and his empl oyer 
had been involved in an ongoing dispute with the owner of the 
Los Lunas airport, John Wood. The dispute centered around 
the glider operations' compliance with FAA rules and regu­
lations. In fact, Wood had closed the airport the day before 
the accident by blocking the runway with several parked vehicles. 
Two days before the accident Wood had stopped Cleveland 
from taking off at the airport by parking his van crosswi se 
across the end of the runway. A court hearing on the dispute 
was scheduled the day of the accident. 
Cleveland proceeded to trial on two theories 
of design negligence: Negligence which prox­
imately caused the initial collision and neg­
ligence which proximately caused the sec­
ond collision. 
On the day of the accident, Wood again blocked the end 
of the runway with his van. The Piper, pulling the glider, 
collided with the van on take-off. Cleveland, who was piloting 
the plane, sustained serious brain injuries when his head struck 
the camera mounted in the front seat. 
Cleveland sued Piper Aircraft. The case proceeded to 
trial on two theories of design negligence. First, inadequate 
visibility from the rear pilot's seat as a proximate cause of the 
initial collision; and second, the lack of a shoulder harness for 
the rear pilot's seat, the second collision theory. The jury 
apportioned fault among the parties under each of the two 
. theories. Significantly, however, the jury found that 100% of 
Cleveland's injuries were attributable to the lack of shoulder 
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ond collision. 
On the day of the accident, Wood again blocked the end 
of the runway with his van. The Piper, pulling the glider, 
collided with the van on take-off. Cleveland, who was piloting 
the plane, sustained serious brain injuries when his head struck 
the camera mounted in the front seat. 
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harness. The special verdict form also indicated, however, that 
the design negligence as to inadequate forward visibility was 
a proximate cause of Cleveland's injuries and damages.16 
The jury found that with regard to the lack of the shoul­
der harness Piper was 91.6 % at fault and Cleveland was 8.4% 
at fault. With regard to the rear seat visibility theory, the jury 
apportioned fault as follows: Piper - 41.7 %, Cleveland -
42.5%, Mudd-15.8%, Wood-0. The district court entered 
judgment against Piper based on the 41.7% finding, despite 
the jury's conclusion that 100% of the injuries to Cleveland 
were caused by the lack of a shoulder harness. 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the basis 
that the jury should have been permitted to compare the fault 
of the initial and second collision tortfeasors. 17 The court held 
that New Mexico law18 required that "as to that portion of 
damages for which the original tortfeasors and the crashwor­
thiness tortfeasors are concurrent tortfeasors, i.e., damages 
attributable to the enhanced injuries, only, the negligence of 
all of the tortfeasors, and of the Plaintiff, must be compared."19 
In other words, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the New Mexico 
law of crashworthiness and comparative negligence to require 
that the negligence of any party proximately causing any 
enhanced injury must be compared including any of the orig­
inal tortfeasors that caused the accident in the first place. 
The Tenth Circuit's decision is fundamen­
tally flawed and represents an unfortunate 
misreading of Duran.
Stated in this manner the opinion sounds so reasonable 
and would appear to comport with New Mexico's system of 
pure comparative fault. And yet, the decision is fundamentally 
flawed. The second collision tort by definition is limited to 
injuries caused by or enhanced by the product defect, that is 
only those injuries resulting from the second collision. The 
Duran court held, as indeed the Tenth Circuit recognized,20 
that the tort of crashworthiness as recognized in New Mexico 
assumes that the injury is divisible. It is a gross misreading 
ofDuran to conclude, as did the Tenth Circuit, that the original 
tortfeasor's negligence in causing the accident may be com­
pared against the manufacturer's design negligence. Why? 
Because such a result requires perforce the assumption that the 
initial injury is indivisible, that the first collision tortfeasor's 
negligence carries over to contribute to the second collision 
injuries. The unanswered conumdrum is how to compare the 
degree of an indivisible injury caused by the original tort­
feaser's negligence with the second collision injuries caused 
by the crashworthiness tortfeaser's design negligence.21 
Part of the difficulty in parsing the Cleveland opinion 
is that the court appears to give contradictory instructions to 
the district court on remand.22 On the one hand, the court 
appears to hold that if the evidence is uncontroverted that no 
injuries would have occurred as a result of the first collision, 
then "no issue is presented for the jury to determine what 
injuries and damages were proximately caused by the negli­
gence of the original tortfeasors."23 So far so good. In the 
very next sentence, however, the court appears to hold that 
the jury must compare the relative fault of all parties and non­
parties whose conduct proximately causes the enhanced injury, 
whether the party or non-party is an "original tortfeasor" or 
the design tortfeasor.24 
The initial tortfeasor's negligence cannot 
be compared with the second collision tort­
feasor's negligence. 
The court's holding that initial and second coll ision 
tortfeasers' negligence must be compared is based on a faulty 
application of New Mexico law and is sure to create tremen­
dous confusion for the jury. The opinion misconstrued New 
Mexico law in a number of respects. The court disregarded 
the express statement in Duran that, because the second col­
lision tort is concerned only with the injuries proximately 
caused by the design defect, "the concurrent tortfeasor concept 
is not applicable."25 Despite this clear statement, the Tenth 
Circuit found that "the logical extension of Bartlett to the case 
before this Court"26 was to require straight comparison of fault. 
The logical fallacy here is that if the initial tortfeasor caused 
the additional injuries, then there is no injury enhanced by the 
design defect and the plaintiff has failed to prove an element 
of the second collision tort. It is for this reason that the Duran 
court properly recognized that in the context of crashworthi­
ness the original and second collision tortfeasors' negligence 
cannot be concurrent and therefore logical ly should not be 
compared. 
Duran was decided long after New Mexico's adoption 
of comparative fault and there is not the slightest indication 
in the decision that the initial collision tortfeasor's negligence 
should be compared to the crashworthiness tortfeasor's design 
negligence.27 The reason for this omission is almost certainly 
because the Duran court focused on the divisibility of injury 
and the requirement that a plaintiff prove the design defect 
"causes or enhances the ultimate injury." Duran, 101 N.M. at 
745.28 
The Tenth Circuit also grounded its conclusion in a 
group of New Mexico cases that, taken as a whole, stand for 
the simple proposition that an initial tortfeasor may be liable 
for a successive act of negligence, if that successive act of 
negligence was foreseeable. See Martinez v. First National 
Bank of Albuquerque, 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 
1987); Vaca v. Whitaker, 86 N.M. 79,519 P.2d 315 (Ct. App. 
1974). Of course the design negligence that causes the second 
collision injury does not succeed the original collision; rather 
it antedates the accident-causing event and, as recognized by 
the Duran court, results in an injury separate and apart from 
the initial collision. Indeed, to allow comparison of an original 
tortfeasor's negligence in causing the accident with the man­
ufacturer's design negligence based on Martinez or Vaca is 
t�tmount to holding that the original tortfeasor should have 
(Continued on Page 160) 
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foreseen the design failure which enhanced the injuries. This 
is a true perversion of the crashworthiness doctrine. 
What is so confounding about the Tenth Circuit's anal­
ysis is its complete disregard for the public policies which 
underlie the tort of crashworthiness. A federal court making 
an "Erie guess" must consider the entire body of a state's law 
which, in the case of New Mexico, finds strong support for 
limiting the comparison of second collision fault to the man­
ufacturer. The New Mexico Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that it will interpret the laws of this state to keep the 
highways safe for the motoring public.29 There is also the 
explicit recognition of the Duran court that the inevitability 
of automobile accidents gives rise to a manufacturer's duty to 
use "reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid 
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event 
of a collision. "30 The focus on the manufacturer for design 
responsibility is eminently practical because the manufacturer 
is the party best able to control the potential risks through the 
design of a reasonably safe vehicle. The Cleveland opinion, 
because it shifts the focus away from the manufacturer's re­
sponsibility for causing enhanced injuries, undermines the very 
purpose of the tort in the first place. 
There is another compelling reason why the Tenth Circuit 
opinion should not be followed by New Mexico's courts. The 
approach set forth by the court shifts some portion of the risk 
of defective designs to parties other than the manufacturer. As 
Justice Traynor recognized long ago, the "purpose [of products 
liability] .. .is to insure that the costs of the injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that 
put such products on the market rather than by the injured 
persons who are powerless to protect themselves."31 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
What to do about Cleveland?32 Fortunately the court's 
"Erie guess" is not binding on state courts. Until such time 
as the New Mexico. appellate courts address this issue the 
Cleveland opinion carries no precedential value in state court. 
The case is binding in federal court, but with all due 
respect to stare decisis, plaintiffs should not be deterred from 
asking the federal district court to reexamine the issue in light 
of a more comprehensive analysis of New Mexico law. Allowing 
a comparision of fault between the original tortfeasor and the 
design tortfeasor for the enhanced injuries is in direct conflict 
with the entire theory underlying the crashworthiness doctrine 
and results in a distortion of the law as articulated by New 
Mexico's appellate courts. In addition, such a comparison is 
itself redundant of the requirements for a recovery in a crash­
worthiness case, that is a party can only recover for that part 
of the injuries which were enhanced by the design defect. 
Plaintiffs must be prepared, however, to litigate a second 
collision case against all of the original tortfeasors and cannot 
afford to simply focus their case on the manufacturer. 
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and a manufacturer's strict liability. Marchese v. Warner Communications 
inc., 100 N.M. 313, 316-17, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1983). A second collision 
case is, however, totally different from the case where a plaintiff may have 
misused the product. The second collision theory assumes that there may have 
been misuse of the product, but that such misuse does not relieve the man-
ufacturer from the duty of design care precisely because such misuse is 
foreseeable. See Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 
(Nev. 1990) ("Negligent driving of a vehicle is a foreseeable risk against which 
a manufacturer is required to take precaution."). The second collision tort fairly 
addresses product misuse by limiting recovery only to those damages caused 
by the design defect. 
22. The other problem with the court's opinion is that its analysis simply does 
not track to the holding. The court recognizes that Duran clearly holds that 
crashworthiness and initial tortfeasors are not concurrent tortfeasors. The court 
also recognizes that New Mexico's standard of proof for a crashworthiness 
case eliminates the potentional for recovery under that theory where the 
injuries are indivisible. These two points should have ended the question 
insofar as the applicable New Mexico law was concerned. The court's opinion, 
however, reaches out to "read" New Mexico law as permitting a different and 
contrary result. 
23. 890 F.2d at 1557. 
24. Id. According to the court's analysis it should be unnecessary to compare 
the original tortfeasor's fault where the design defect caused all of the injury. 
The court, however, gives flatly contradictory instructions on this very point 
to the district court. In addition, the facts of Cleveland itself, where the jury 
did find that 100% of the injuries were caused by the absence of the rear 
shoulder harness, the design defect and the court's treatment of that fact, at 
least suggest that under Cleveland it may still be required to apportion fault 
between design and original tortfeasors even where the evidence shows that 
all of the injury was caused by the design tortfeasor.
25. Duran, IOI N.M. at 750. The Tenth Circuit's answer to what would appear 
to be the unequivocal statement in Duran was to undertake an independent
analysis of Huddell v. Levin, to determine that the Duran court really did 
not intend its holding that the initial and second collision tortfeasors were not 
concurrent and therefore, implicitly, one would not compare their negligence 
for the enhanced injuries. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's discussion of Huddell 
is demonstrably wrong because not only does that portion of the Huddell 
opinion suggest that one would not compare the fault of initial and second 
collision tortfeasors, but moreover, the Huddell court's discussion makes clear 
that the theoretical underpinnings of second collision cases are fundamentally 
in conflict with notions of concurrent fault. Huddell, 537 F.2d at 738-39 
quoted in Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1549. 
26. Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1550-51. 
27. The Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions for Civil Cases comments 
to the products liability section of the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions 
which discusses Duran also makes no reference to the possibility that fault 
should be apportioned between the initial and second collision tortfeasors. 
28. This result is in accord with conclusions reached in other jurisdictions. 
See e.g., Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092 (Nev. 1990)C'It 
is difficult to envision a situation in which a plaintiff's negligence would be 
relevant to the issue of whether a design defect relating to crashworthiness 
was the proximate cause of his injuries."); Cota v. Harley Davidson, 684 
P.2d 888 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Admittedly these cases arose in jurisdictions 
where the crashworthiness tort sounds in strict liability, but the results are 
consistent with the essential theory underlying second collision liability. 
29. See Miller v. New Mexico Department of Transportation, 106 N.M. 
253, 255, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987) ("The sole purpose of the waiver in Section 
41-4-11 (A) is to ensure that highways are made safe and kept safe for the
traveling public."); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 59,
618 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[T]he New Mexico Legislature intended to 
protect the general public from injury by imposing liability upon governmental 
agencies when they fail to maintain safe public highways."). 
30. Duran, 101 N.M. at 744.
31. Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897,901 (Cal. 1963); 
Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 730, 733, 497 P.2d 732 (1972) (rec­
ognizing that "[t]he basis of risk distribution was that the loss should be placed 
on those most able to bear it and they should distribute the risk of loss to 
users of the product in the form of higher prices"). 
32. On remand to the district court, Piper Aircraft raised the issue of federal 
preemption, another approach used by manufacturers to avoid their duties to 
the public. See, e.g., Kitts v. General Motors Corporation, 875 F.2d 787 
(10th Cir. 1989); Wood v. General Motors, 895 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988). 
Judge Mechem rejected the defense, but made the necessary findings to permit 
Piper Aircraft to pursue an interlocutory appeal The case is now pending in 
the Tenth Circuit. •I�--
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